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) (		CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
	·	WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
0-14		14 August 1981
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,,,	MEMORANDUM FOR:	The Director of Central Intelligence
``,	FROM :	John H. Stein Deputy Director for Operations
	SUBJECT :	USSR GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSONS :
		The Breakthrough by Front Troops of the Prepared Enemy Defense:
		Supplementary Material
		losed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
	weapons. This reconcerning the br	cional weapons at first with a transition to the use of nuclear eport is a translation of supplementary material for the lesson reakthrough of a ground defense line prepared by NATO forces in a of West Germany. The material consists of brief reports by
	the <u>front</u> 's intel air <u>defense</u> troop outlining the imp this supplement r	digence and operations chiefs, air army commander, and chief of os, and the front commander's own report to highest headquarters elementation of his decision for the breakthrough operation. In nuclear weapons are not used, but are to be in readiness.
	the front's intel air defense troop outlining the important this supplement results.  2. Because	os, and the front commander's own report to highest headquarters of the breakthrough operation. In
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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB-

312/02294-81

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14 August 1981

SUBJECT

GENERAL STAFF ACADEMY LESSON No. 21: The Breakthrough by Front Troops of the Prepared Enemy Defense: Supplementary Material

SOURCE Documentary

#### Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of supplementary material for a lesson, classified TOP SECRET, prepared for use at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This supplement is used to instruct students acting as a front commander, his chiefs of intelligence, operations, and air defense troops, and his air army commander, in the presentation of brief reports covering the following: the enemy's situation and probable actions; the front's situation and proposed tasking; the air army's status, proposed targets, and timetable of actions by tactical aircraft and fire support helicopters; the assessment of NATO's air situation by the chief of the air defense troops, and his proposals regarding air cover of front troops; and the front commander's report to General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command summarizing the overall situation and outlining the tasking of his principal assets to accomplish the breakthrough of the NATO defense line.

End of Summary

Comment	٠
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1. Lessons Nos. 21a and 21c, which this report supplements, were disseminated as FIRDB-312/00458-81 and FIRDB-312/02978-80 respectively.

2. Although not specifically identified, the colors representing NATO countries in this material probably equate as follows:

Brown -- West Germany Blue -- Great Britain Green -- United States

Lilac -- Belgium

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# OF THE COASTAL FRONT ON THE SITUATION AT 1900 HOURS 8 SEPTEMBER

1. In the <u>front</u> zone, the enemy, with the forces of four army corps of the Northern Army Group supported by massed strikes of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, mounted an invasion into the territory of the German Democratic Republic, delivering the main thrust on the BERLIN axis with the forces of the Brown 1st Army Corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps and a second thrust on the PRITZWALK axis with the forces of the Brown 4th and 6th army corps. As a result of the meeting engagements the enemy has succeeded in breaking through the border in three sectors: north and south of BOIZENBURG with the forces of the 13th and 6th motorized infantry divisions of the 6th Army Corps and the 14th Motorized Infantry Division of the 4th Army Corps; at BOMENZIEN and SALZWEDEL with the forces of the 16th Tank Division of the 4th Army Corps; at HARBKE and OSTERWIECK with the forces of the Blue 1st Army Corps; and in advancing into the interior of our territory for a distance of 15 to 30 km.

On the PRITZWALK axis the enemy has up to 800 tanks and more than 450 guns and mortars in the complement of the first echelon troops of the 6th and 4th army corps on both sides of the ELBE River. To develop an offensive as of the morning of 9 September, the 21st Motorized Infantry Division of the 6th Army Corps and the 15th Motorized Infantry Division of the 4th Army Corps can be committed into battle in the direction of SEEHAUSEN and NEURUPPIN.

On the MAGDEBURG axis there are in the complement of the Blue 1st Army Corps up to 500 tanks and 300 guns and mortars. Taking into account the brigade reserves, this grouping is in a condition to develop an offensive before the close of 8 September. As of the morning of 9 September the commitment to battle of the 4th Armored Division in the direction of MAGDEBURG should be expected.

2. Simultaneously with the development of an offensive on the designated axes, the enemy will attempt, by stubborn defense of prepared lines on the NEUMINSTER and HANNOVER axes, to prevent a breakthrough by attack groupings of front troops in order to support the advance and deployment of his operational reserves.

On the prepared line TRAVEMUNDE, LUBECK, then along the ELBE-LUBECK Canal to ALTEN-MELN /ALT MOLLN/, the 18th Motorized Infantry Division of the 6th Army Corps, with a strength of more than 250 tanks, up to 140 guns and mortars, and up to 100 antitank guns and antitank guided missiles, has gone over to the defense. In the first echelon of the 18th Motorized Infantry Division, the 52nd

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and 53rd motorized infantry brigades, having pulled back from the front, have taken up the defense on a frontage of more than 30 km. In the first line the brigades have four motorized infantry battalions with tanks, and in the second line up to two tank battalions with 40 to 50 tanks in each. In the second echelon of the division there is up to a tank brigade, which is going over to the defense on the line BAD SEGEBERG, TRAVE River, SULFELD, STEGEN.

On the axis of the offensive by the main forces of the 7th and 9th armies, large units of the Brown 1st Army Corps have gone over to the defense on the prepared line (excluding) UELZEN, BRAÜNSCHWEIG.

In the first echelon of the 1st Army Corps, the 1st Motorized Infantry Division (mimus a brigade) and the 3rd and 7th tank divisions, which have in their complement more than 550 tanks, more than 250 guns and mortars, and up to 200 antitank guns and antitank guided missiles, are taking up the defense on a frontage of up to 80 km. The density of forces and means per kilometer of frontage amounts to 7 to 8 tanks, 4 to 5 guns and mortars, and up to three antitank guns and antitank guided missiles.

The reserves of the 3rd Tank Division, up to a tank brigade, and of the 7th Tank Division, up to a tank battalion, are going over to the defense on the line WOLTHAUSEN, CELLE, (excluding) MEHRUM, SOSSMAR.

In the second echelon of the 1st Army Corps is the 11th Motorized Infantry Division, which is positioned northeast of NIENBURG.

The enemy's defense from the engineer standpoint is best prepared and developed to the depth of the first-echelon brigades, consists of platoon and company strongpoints and battalion areas, and has a developed system of artillery and mortar positions. At strongpoints, positions for tanks, antitank guns, and antitank guided missiles have been prepared. The intervals between strongpoints are covered by antipersonnel and antitank obstacles.

- 3. The closest operational reserves -- up to six divisions (the Lilac 1st and 2nd army corps and the Green 4th Motorized Division) -- are concentrated in areas north, south, and west of BREMEN, and south of OSNABRUCK, at a distance of 100 to 120 km from the forward edge.
- 4. Enemy aviation (the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force and naval aviation, consisting of 700 combat aircraft) in the course of the day have carried out up to 2,000 sorties, concentrating their main efforts on the HAMBURG-PARCHIM and HANNOVER-MACDEBURG axes. The aviation is delivering strikes against troops and installations in groups of 8 to 15 aircraft.

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#### Conclusion

- 1. The <u>front</u> staff does not have data available regarding the enemy's preparations to employ nuclear weapons. However, the possibility of the enemy going over to actions with nuclear weapons in the struggle to hold defense lines and in order to develop the offensive cannot be excluded.
- 2. The enemy will continue the offensive by committing to battle the second echelons and reserves of the army corps.

By a stubborn defense on the NELMUNSTER and HANNOVER axes, the enemy will endeavor to prevent the forward defense line from being breached, to inflict defeat on the front attack groupings, and to support the advance and deployment of reserves.

The immediate operational reserves (up to six divisions) can be committed to battle as of the morning of 10 September to develop the offensive or to deliver a counterthrust for the purpose of reestablishing the defense.

### REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE OF

#### THE FRONT STAFF ON THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE DEFENSE

(Lesson No. 21)

1. Coastal Front troops have defeated the forward units of the 18th Motorized Infantry Division of the /Brown/ 6th Army Corps and the Brown 1st Army Corps in meeting engagements and have advanced into enemy territory on the HANNOVER axis to a depth of 15 to 30 km and on the NEUMINSTER axis to a depth of 5 to 15 km, advancing to the defense lines prepared and occupied by enemy troops, but not succeeding in breaking through them from the march. At the same time, the 4th Army on the left flank, the 7th Army on the right flank, and the 9th Army on the left flank are repulsing the attacks of the invading enemy groupings.

The situation and condition of the front troops are as follows:

-- The 4th Army with two divisions (the 3rd and 7th motorized rifle divisions) has advanced to the enemy defense line, having encountered organized resistance from units of the 18th Motorized Infantry Division, and with two divisions is engaged in battle with units of the Brown 6th and 4th army corps which have invaded the territory of the German Democratic Republic.

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The overall balance of forces and means in the army zone with respect to divisions and tanks is one of parity with the enemy, but in artillery the army has two to one superiority, and the balance is especially advantageous in our favor on the LUBECK axis -- in divisions two to one, in tanks one and a half to one, and in artillery five to one. On the LUGWIGSLUST axis the enemy has superiority.

The 3rd and 7th motorized rifle divisions, the army artillery, the reinforcement artillery, and the battalion artillery of the 2nd Tank Division can be allocated for breaking through the defense of the Brown 18th Motorized Infantry Division. A density having been established that exceeds 100 guns, mortars, and combat vehicles per kilometer of breakthrough front, the breakthrough is to be carried out in the NIEDERBUSSAU, BERKENTHIN sector.

-- In the attack zones of the 7th and 9th armies, combat actions have developed on three axes. On the HANNOVER axis the main forces of the two armies are concentrating on their adjacent flanks for the breakthrough of the prepared defense line occupied by large units of the Brown 1st Army Corps on both flanks of the front attack grouping; on our territory defensive battles are continuing.

In the first echelon of the 7th Army, the 1st and 4th motorized rifle divisions and the 9th and 5th tank divisions are conducting combat actions. The 11th motorized rifle division is in the second echelon of the army. The 9th Army, with the 10th Tank Division and the 18th, 21st, and 23rd motorized rifle divisions in the first echelon, is conducting with the forces of the 21st and 23rd motorized rifle divisions a defensive battle against units of the Blue 1st Army Corps.

In the second echelon of the army are the 6th Motorized Rifle Division and the 26th Tank Division.

The attack grouping of <u>front</u> troops on the HANNOVER axis is superior to the enemy in terms of the number of first-echelon divisions, tanks, and artillery, and on the axis of actions by its main forces and means it has a superiority in divisions and tanks of more than one and one-half to one and in artillery of more than three to one.

On the flanks of the 7th and 9th armies, the enemy has superiority in tanks and artillery.

To break through the defense of the Brown 1st Army Corps and develop the attack the following can be allocated: four divisions of the 7th Army (the 4th and 11th motorized rifle divisions and the 5th and 9th tank divisions), three divisions of the 9th Army (the 6th and 18th motorized rifle divisions and the 10th Tank Division), army artillery of three armies (the 7th, 9th, and 6th armies), reinforcement artillery (the 8th and 11th artillery divisions of the

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Reserve of the Supreme High Command), and the divisional artillery of the 9th Army's 26th Tank Division.

It is advisable to break through the enemy defense as follows: in the zone of the 7th Army at the WESENDORF, (excluding) KASTORF sector; in the zone of the 9th Army at the sectors of KASTORF, (excluding) GIFHORN and (excluding) GIFHORN, ROTGESBUTTEL, with a total extension of 17 km, and having established a density of more than 110 gums, mortars and combat vehicles per kilometer of breakthrough front.

#### BRIEF REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 1ST AIR ARMY ON

#### THE SITUATION AT 1900 HOURS 8 SEPTEMBER

(variant)

The 1st Air Army throughout 8 September fulfilled its tasks according to the plan of the initial massed strike of the air operation and the <u>front</u> plan, with an expenditure of two army sorties.

Air army losses consist of 48 combat aircraft and 7 fire support helicopters (approximately 6 percent of its initial combat strength).

Before the close of day the air army is to deliver the second massed strike according to the air operation plan and support <u>front</u> troops with part of the forces -- three regimental sorties of fighter-bombers and three regimental sorties of fire support helicopters.

By 0700 hours 9 September the air army is to be in readiness with its main forces (three regimental sorties of bomber aviation, six regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation, and four regimental sorties of separate helicopter regiments) for joint actions with the front troops in the breakthrough of the enemy forward defense line in the sector WESENDORF, (excluding) MEINE in the zones of the 7th and 9th armies.

To fulfil the tasks of the air army in the breakthrough of the enemy forward defense line by front troops, I have decided:

1. To carry out the air preparation for the attack in the breakthrough sector of the 7th and 9th armies with two regimental sorties of bombers, two regimental sorties of fighter-bombers, and two fire support helicopter regiments, keeping the 6th Separate Helicopter Regiment with suspended antitank

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guided missiles in reserve on the forward landing pads in the 9th Army's zone.

Targets and strike times are to have been coordinated with the troops of the 7th and 9th armies as follows:

- -- in the period H-hour minus 0.18 to H-hour minus 0.07 two regimental sorties of fighter-bombers are to destroy the Hawk battery in the INMENSEN area, two antiaircraft batteries in the area of SHTERNKHORST /sic -- probably STEINHORST/ and HOFER, the Lance launchers in the BERGEN area, two Honest John batteries in the areas of HOHNHORST and ZWEIDORF, and the helicopters on the landing pads in the FASSBERG and LANGENHAUSEN areas; and the Brown 1st Army Corps command post in the OTZE area is be neutralized;
- -- in the period from H-hour minus 0.14 to H-hour minus 0.07 two enemy tank battalions in the areas of ESCHEDE and southeast of HERMANNSBURG are to be destroyed by two regimental sorties of bombers;
- -- in the period from H-hour minus 0.26 to H-hour minus 0.18 and H-hour minus 0.07 the dug-in tanks and other armored targets and antitank means in the breakthrough sector of the 7th and 9th armies are to be destroyed by two regimental sorties of fire support helicopters.
- 2. As of H-hour minus 0.04, to have in Readiness No. 1 and No. 2 at the airfields and landing pads two fighter-bomber air regiments from the 2nd and 4th fighter-bomber divisions and two fire support helicopter regiments (using the 6th Separate Helicopter Regiment) in order to provide air support for the attack and air close support for the attacking troops of the 7th and 9th armies upon request from the Air Army's combat control center.
- 3. In accordance with the 4th Army commander's plan, to allocate one regimental sortie of the fighter-bomber aviation from the 8th Fighter-Bomber Division and one regimental sortie from the 4th Separate Helicopter Regiment in order to carry out the preparatory fire for the attack in the breakthrough sector of the 4th Army.
- 4. To reinforce the troop cover of the 7th and 9th armies during the breakthrough of the enemy defense line, doing this by increasing the detail of airborne alert forces from the 3rd and 5th fighter divisions (each having two flights of fighters continuously in the airborne alert zones).
- 5. At dawn 9 September, to have in readiness one bomber regiment and two fighter-bomber regiments to deliver a strike against the enemy's advancing reserves in the offensive zone of the 7th and 9th armies.

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#### REPORT

#### OF THE CHIEF OF AIR DEFENSE TROOPS OF THE COASTAL FRONT

(appendix on the organization of air defense troops during the breakthrough of the forward defense line)

- 1. Front air defense troops, in cooperation with the fighter aviation of the 1st Air Army, the troops of the 6th Air Defense Corps, and the air defense means of the Combined Baltic Fleet and Western Front, during the day of 8 September successfully repulsed enemy air strikes against troops and installations, destroying up to 80 enemy aircraft.
- 2. The air enemy, having lost in a massed strike up to 15 percent of his forces, retains the capacity to deliver massed and concentrated strikes against front troops and installations.

A massed strike by the air enemy with forces of up to 500 to 600 aircraft against front troops and installations is possible as of the morning of 9 September. At night aggressive enemy air actions with small groups and single aircraft are possible, as before, from the west and northwest directions at medium and high altitudes under the cover of intensive jamming by electronic means.

- 3. From enemy air strikes and artillery and mortar fire, losses in front air defense forces and means do not on the average exceed 10 to 15 percent, i.e., air defense large units and units are combat-effective and the air defense system in the armies and the front on the whole has not been disrupted.
  - 4. For carrying out the assigned air defense tasks I propose:
- 1) To reinforce the cover of the troops of the front's main attack grouping (the 7th and 9th armies), which is breaking through the enemy forward defense line on the HANNOVER axis, with the 15th Front Surface-to-Air Missile Brigade and the main forces of the 3rd and 5th fighter divisions of the front air army. Subsequently to cover with these same forces the forward movement and commitment to battle of the second echelons of the 7th and 9th armies.

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- 2) To cover the attack grouping of the 4th Army on the HAMBURG axis with the organic means of the army, the 10th Antiaircraft Artillery Division of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command /RVGK/, and the 1st Fighter Division of the air army in cooperation with the 33rd and 34th fighter regiments of the 6th Air Defense Corps.
- 3) To control the air defense forces and means from the <u>front</u> air defense command post and the air defense command posts of the armies.
- 4) The air defense forces are to be in readiness at 0300 hours 9 September.

#### BRIEF REPORT

#### OF THE COASTAL FRONT COMMANDER TO THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND ON THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE DEFENSE

(Lesson No. 21)

1. In the <u>front</u> zone, the enemy, with the forces of four army corps of the Northern Army Group supported by massed air strikes, mounted an invasion into the territory of the German Democratic Republic, delivering the main thrust on the BERLIN axis and achieving his greatest success on the PRITZWALK and MAGDEBURG axes, where the Brown 6th and 4th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps, having established superiority in forces and means, can develop the offensive before the close of 8 September and as of the morning of 9 September.

At the same time, by stubborn defense of prepared lines with the forces of the 18th Motorized Infantry Division of the Brown 6th Army Corps on the HAMBURG axis and of the Brown 1st Army Corps on the HANNOVER axis, the enemy will strive to prevent a breakthrough by the attack groupings of front troops, so as to safeguard the forward movement and concentration of his deep operational reserves.

2. During the first day of combat actions the Coastal Front inflicted defeat on the forward units of the 18th Motorized Infantry Division of the Brown 6th Army Corps on the HAMBURG axis and on the 1st Motorized Infantry Division and 3rd and 7th tank divisions of the Brown 1st Army Corps on the HANNOVER axis, reaching with its attack groupings the enemy's prepared defense lines, which it did not succeed in breaking through from the march.

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On the PRITZWALK and MAGDEBURG axes the <u>front</u>, with the forces of two 4th Army divisions, one 7th Army division, two 9th Army divisions, and the air support of the 1st Air Army, is repulsing the attack by units of the Brown 6th and 4th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps.

To break through the enemy defense on the morning of 9 September, it will be necessary during the night to form attack groupings and concentrate artillery against the breakthrough sectors.

I have decided: to break through the enemy defense lines with the main forces of the 7th and 9th armies on the HANNOVER axis at the sectors WESENDORF, (excluding) GIFHORN, and (excluding) GIFHORN, ROTGESBUTTEL; and with the main forces of the 4th Army on the NEUMINSTER axis in the NIEDERBUSSAU, BERKENTHIN sector. The following are included in the first echelons of attack groupings for the breakthrough of the enemy defense: in the zone of the 4th Army -- the 3rd and 7th motorized rifle divisions; on the adjacent flanks of the 7th and 9th armies -- the 5th Tank Division and 11th Motorized Rifle Division, the 10th Tank Division and 6th Motorized Rifle Division, and the tank regiment of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division. To develop the breakthrough in the second half of the day of 9 September /I have decided/ to commit to battle the 4th Army's 2nd Tank Division on the NEUMINSTER axis and the 9th Army's 26th Tank Division on the HANNOVER axis.

To allocate the main mass of <u>front</u> artillery and aviation for preparatory fire and support of advancing troops, establishing in the breakthrough sectors a density in excess of 100 guns, mortars, and combat vehicles per kilometer of front.

The duration of the preparatory fire is 32 minutes. The readiness time for the offensive is 0700 hours.

To rout the enemy's defending troops during 9 September and by the close of the day to seize the following lines: TRAVEMUNDE, AHRENSBURG, SCHWARZENBEK; and UNTERLUSS, LEHRTE, WOLFENBUTTEL.

Subsequently to seize HANNOVER, rout enemy corps reserves, and develop the offensive with the forces of the 7th Army on the CLOPPENBURG axis, the 9th Army on the OSNABRUCK axis, and with the forces of the 4th Army in the direction of RENDSBURG.

To halt with part of the  $\underline{\text{front}}$  forces a further advance by invading enemy groupings.

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#### Troop tasks:

-- The 4th Army on the morning of 9 September with the forces of the 3rd and 7th motorized rifle divisions is to deliver a thrust in the direction of KRIMESSE, BAD SEGEBERG, to break through the enemy defense in the sector (excluding) NIEDERBUSSAU, (excluding) BERKENTHIN, and by the close of day capture the line TRAVEMINDE, AHRENSBURG, SCHWARZENBERG /sic/.

A part of the forces is to secure the line MOLLN, ZARRENTIN, WEHNINGEN and bar a further advance by the enemy.

Flight resources on 9 September are two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation and three regimental sorties of army aviation.

-- The 7th Army on the morning of 9 September with the forces of the 5th Tank Division and 11th Motorized Rifle Division is to deliver a thrust in the direction of WESENDORF, CELLE, break through the enemy defense in the sector WESENDORF, (excluding) KASTORF, and by the close of day reach the line UNITERLUSS, WINSEN, WETIMAR.

With a part of its forces it is to secure the line KLUDEN, ROSSAU, (excluding) SALZWEDEL and bar an enemy breakthrough in the directions of OSTERBURG and KEMNITZ.

Flight resources on 9 September are two regimental sorties of fighter-bomber aviation and two regimental sorties of army aviation.

-- The 9th Army on the morning of 9 September with the forces of the 10th Tank Division, the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, and the tank regiment of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division is to deliver a thrust in the direction of ROTGESBUTTEL, HANNOVER, break through the enemy defense in the sectors KASTORF, (excluding) GIFHORN; and (excluding) GIFHORN, ROTGESBUTTEL, and by the close of the day capture the line STELLE, LERNE /sic -- LERRTE/, SEHNDE, WOLFENBUTTEL.

With the forces of the 21st and 23rd motorized rifle divisions and the antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments of the army and front, and with the air support of the 1st Air Army, it is to block a further advance by the units of the Blue 1st Army Corps.

Flight resources on 9 September are two regimental sorties /?of fighter-bomber aviation/ and two regimental sorties of army aviation.

-- The 2nd Army Corps by the morning of 9 September is to concentrate in the area of SCHWERIN, PARCHIM, STERNBERG.

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- -- The 6th Army by the morning of 9 September is to concentrate in the area of KALBE, COLBITZ, BURG, BRANDENBURG.
- -- The 10th Army by the morning of 9 September is to concentrate in the area of MYSLIBORZ, ZHELIN /sic -- RZEPIN/, SKWIERZYNA.
- -- The rocket troops are to be in readiness to deliver the initial nuclear strike.

The artillery:

- -- is to destroy the enemy's tactical means of nuclear attack;
- -- is to inflict fire destruction on the Brown 6th and 4th army corps and the Blue 1st Army Corps;
- -- is to inflict fire destruction on the enemy in the breakthrough sectors and on the sectors' flanks by conducting preparatory fire lasting 32 minutes with a density of 100 to 110 gums and mortars per kilometer of front;
- -- is to provide artillery support for the attack with a rolling barrage in conjunction with a successive fire concentration into the depth of the defense of the first-echelon battalions; /and provide/ artillery close support to the attacking troops during combat in the depth of the enemy defense by means of massed and concentrated fire;
- -- the artillery is to have the preparatory fire for the attack ready at 0700 hours 9 September;
- -- The 1st Air Army is to deliver before the approach of darkness a second massed strike according to the air operation plan and support the <u>front</u> troops within the limits of the allocated flight resources;
- -- by 0700 hours 9 September it is to be in readiness to participate in the preparatory fire for the attack during the breakthrough of the enemy defense line in the WESENDORF, ROTGESBUTTEL sector.
- -- the flight resources to be expended on 9 September are three army sorties, including one according to the air operation plan.

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